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Concluding the WTO services negotiations
on domestic regulation – hopes and fears
PANAG IOT I S DEL IMATS I S *
Assistant Professor of Law and Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC), Tilburg University, The Netherlands
Abstract : The negotiations under the aegis of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) on the creation of rules on domestic regulations affecting trade in services
have entered a critical stage. Within a general atmosphere of reflection and
reluctance characterizing the Doha negotiations, this is the only front in recent
years in which tangible progress is evident. This paper critically analyses the
potential rules that Members currently appear to support and attempts to identify
their shortcomings as well as those modifications or clarifications which are
necessary to improve the impact and efficacy of the forthcoming rules (so-called
‘disciplines on domestic regulation’ in the parlance used in the General
Agreement on Trade in Services – GATS). At the heart of the paper lies a thought-
provoking proposal for a necessity test applicable across services sectors.
Arguably, only a necessity test can allow for the elimination of unnecessary
barriers to trade in services and regulatory arbitrariness.
1. Introduction
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) is a highly incomplete con-
tract.1 The obligations enshrined therein were drafted in an ambiguous manner,
whereas their scope has remained unclear in the absence of any substantial effort
by the WTO legislative to clarify it after the Uruguay Round.2 This is all the more
striking in the case of GATS obligations relating to domestic regulation.3 Such a
constellation inevitably gives a more prominent role to the WTO adjudicating
* Email: p.delimatsis@uvt.nl
The author would like to thank theWorld Trade Review referees for their insightful comments. Remaining
errors are of the author’s alone.
1 On the incompleteness of the WTO agreements, see H. Horn, G. Maggi, and R. Staiger, ‘Trade
Agreements as Endogenously Incomplete Contracts’, NBERWorking Paper No. 12745, December 2006;
and S. Schropp, Trade Policy Flexibility and Enforcement in the WTO – A Law and Economics Analysis
(Cambridge University Press, 2009), Chapter 3.
2 Sectoral initiatives such as those on financial, telecommunications, and accountancy services are the
notable exceptions.
3 Under the GATS jargon, domestic regulation relates to national measures that are aimed to ensure
the quality of the service supplied and which do not discriminate (and thus do not fall under the national
treatment obligation of Art. XVII GATS) or constitute quantitative limitations (and thus do not come
under the market access obligation of Art. XVI GATS).
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bodies. However, harnessing regulatory diversity in trade in services through
adjudication is becoming increasingly challenging and controversial, as the US–
Gambling saga4 amply demonstrated. Whereas coming to grips with origin-neutral
measures that protect domestic interests was one of the objectives of the Uruguay
Round, compliance with this duty becomes daunting due to the fact that trade-
restrictive effects are typically generated by origin-neutral regulatory measures.
The condemnation by international courts of non-discriminatory domestic
measures brings about varying reactions from domestic circles, as it challenges
anachronistic views about sovereignty and state prerogatives. There may be
several ways to properly address these criticisms nowadays.5 Nevertheless, like any
international court, the WTO adjudicator (the agent) meets the expectations of the
WTO Members and indirectly their citizens (the principals)6 and adequately
completes the WTO contract if it chooses the path of consistency, legal coherence,
detailed argumentation, and sophisticated judicial reasoning.7 In so doing, it
should properly take into account the balance established in the WTO Agreements
‘between the jurisdictional competences conceded by the Members to the WTO
and the jurisdictional competences retained by the Members for themselves ’.8
4 At issue was a total prohibition, imposed by the United States, of the remote (including cross-border)
supply of gambling and betting services. The dispute attracted the interest of many authors who expressed
diverging views on the rightness of the Appellate Body ruling. See, inter alia, J. Pauwelyn, ‘Rien ne Va
Plus? Distinguishing Domestic Regulation from Market Access in GATT and GATS’, World Trade
Review, 4(2) (2005), 131; P. Delimatsis, ‘Don’t Gamble with GATS – The Interaction between Articles
VI, XVI, XVII and XVIII GATS in the Light of the US–Gambling Case’, Journal of World Trade, 40(6)
(2006), 1059; P. Mavroidis, ‘Highway XVI Re-visited: The Road from Non-Discrimination to Market
Access in the GATS’, World Trade Review, 6(1) (2007), 1. That the measure at issue was indeed a
protectionist, self-defeating one was later proven during the Article 21.5 DSU proceedings. See Panel
Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting
Services – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Antigua and Barbuda (US–Gambling (Article
21.5 – Antigua and Barbuda)), WT/DS285/RW, adopted 22 May 2007, DSR 2007:VIII, 3105, paras.
6.31, 6.126, 6.130–6.135.
5 See, generally, J. Jackson, Sovereignty, the WTO, and Changing Fundamentals of International Law
(Cambridge University Press, 2006); also K. Raustiala, ‘Rethinking the Sovereignty Debate in
International Economic Law’, Journal of International Economic Law, 6(4) (2003), 841.
6 K. Alter, ‘Agents or Trustees? International Courts in their Political Context’, European Journal of
International Relations, 14(1) (2008), 33.
7 For an economic viewpoint regarding judicial completion of the contract, see G. Maggi and
R. Staiger, ‘On the Role and Design on Dispute Settlement Procedures in International Trade
Agreements’, NBER Working Paper No. 14067, 2008.
8 Appellate Body Report, EC – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (EC–Hormones),
WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted 13 February 1998, DSR 1998:I, 135, para. 115. The WTO
adjudicating bodies form a sort of epistemic community which appears to be fully aware of its mission.
Cf. Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico
(US–Stainless Steel (Mexico)), WT/DS344/AB/R, adopted 20 May 2008, paras. 160–161 and fn 313; also
J. Bacchus, ‘Leeky’s Circle: Thoughts from the Frontier of International Law’, Address to the Institute of
Advanced Legal Studies, University of London, 10 April 2003, p. 7, quoted in A. Cortell and S. Peterson,
‘Dutiful Agents, Rogue Actors, or Both? Staffing, Voting Rules, and Slack in the WHO and WTO’, in
D. Hawkins, D. Lake, D. Nielson, andM. Tierney,Delegation and Agency in International Organizations
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 274.
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Again, this does not alter the fact that constructive ambiguity, which has been the
drafting method par excellence throughout the history of the GATT and the
WTO,9 leaves the WTO adjudicator with little guidance as to the collective
preferences of the WTOMembership. Absent any precise guidance from the WTO
legislative and executive branch, which the judicial branch could utilize, the
identification of the common intention of Members regarding a given issue can
only be based on judicial constructions, which inevitably cannot satisfy the inter-
ests of every single WTO Member.10
Just as is the case with domestic courts, for the successful accomplishment of
their delicate mission, the WTO adjudicating bodies cannot but use ‘proxies ’. By
proxies we understand those objective elements (e.g. legal principles, international
standards, and so on) that can be used to enlighten the uninformed party (i.e. the
judiciary) as to the intent of the regulating Member and thus ensure equality of
competitive opportunities among the service suppliers active in a given market,
while respecting that Member’s regulatory autonomy. Notably in the case of
origin-neutral measures, which purportedly aim to guarantee a certain level of
quality in the delivery of services, the WTO adjudicator has to be particularly
vigilant in the examination of the facts at issue and their legal characterization. It is
exactly in such difficult cases that the use of proxies is warranted, as they typically
serve to reach a reasonable conclusion, even when based on limited evidence.11
The use of proxies allows for informed judgments and adds to the legitimacy
and acceptability by the WTO Members of these judgments, simply because
Members themselves have agreed on their validity and their important guiding
function that they can overall play. The principles of necessity and transparency,
together with the use of international standards, are the most important legal
instruments or yardsticks that the WTO drafters bestowed upon the Panels and
the Appellate Body to allow for the detection of regulatory arbitrariness and
9 As Howse and Nicolaidis argue, this type of ambiguity has ‘merely served to delay confronting hard
questions’. See R. Howse and K. Nicolaidis, ‘Legitimacy through ‘‘Higher Law’’? Why
Constitutionalizing the WTO Is a Step Too Far’, in T. Cottier and P. Mavroidis (eds.), The Role of the
Judge in International Trade Regulation – Experience and Lessons for the WTO (Michigan University
Press, 2003), p. 317.
10 Cf. among manifold examples, the intepretation of the Schedules of Commitments in the
US–Gambling case or the acceptance of amicus curiae briefs in the US–Shrimp case. One should add to
this the practical problems that Panels and the Appellate Body have to tackle. These problems are asso-
ciated with the increasing workload and the lack of coordination among parties, or the fact that sometimes
evidence is submitted and claims are raised at an advanced stage of the process. Cf. Panel Report,
European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products
(EC–Biotech), WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R, Add.1 to Add.9, and Corr.1, adopted
21 November 2006, DSR 2006:III-VIII, 847, paras. 7.37–7.45.
11 For instance, the disparate impact of a legislation has been regarded by the US Supreme Court as a
proxy for intent to discriminate. See R. Primus, ‘The Future of Disparate Impact’,Michigan Law Review,
108 (2010, forthcoming). The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has also adopted a similar reasoning in
cases relating to the fundamental freedoms of free movement, for instance by striking down residency
requirements, as they have a heavier impact on non-nationals. See, among others, C-145/99, Commission
v Italy [2002] ECR I-2235.
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protectionist abuse. This emergence of proxies during the Uruguay Round was
deemed necessary in view of Members’ determination to shift their interest from
non-discrimination to bringing some discipline to origin-neutral measures that
may have deleterious effects on trade, as they could substantially underminemarket
access commitments. The obligations enclosed in several WTO agreements and
notably the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), the Agreement on
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), and the GATS fully manifest this
determination.
Now that the WTO negotiations on domestic regulation in services have taken
a critical turn, this paper aims to make a clear and thought-provoking case for
the efficient incorporation of the principles of necessity and transparency into
the forthcoming regulatory disciplines on domestic regulation. These principles
constitute the most important ‘protectionism revelation’ proxies.12 The paper
argues for the inclusion in the final text of disciplines that give flesh to these
proxies. This is necessary, not only for the sake of loyalty to their previous com-
mitments, but also in order to improve the quality and trade-responsiveness of
their domestic regulations in services. This is particularly relevant for the principle
of necessity and the so-called necessity test which appears to be one of the most
controversial issues under discussion in the current services negotiations.13
Section 2 describes the framework within which Members negotiate the content
of the rules on domestic regulation and the challenges that they face. Section 3
critically discusses the most recent Draft rules on domestic regulation, their
novelties, and their shortcomings. Based on the wording of the GATS and the
proposals advanced to date as to the most adequate protectionist revelation test,
Section 4 puts forward a possible framework for such a test that is likely to attract
considerable support among Members, whilst Section 5 explains why the appli-
cation of a necessity test by the WTO adjudicator is inevitable. Last, but not least,
Section 6 tackles a few practical issues, which, if not carefully considered, could
render the forthcoming rules dead letter. Section 7 concludes.
2. Tackling non-discriminatory regulatory conduct in services at a global
level – the long and winding road
Since regulatory intensity and diversity is the common theme in manifold services
sectors, and border measures are essentially inapplicable in the case of trade in
services, ‘within-the-border’ domestic regulations that are unduly burdensome are
targeted as the most restrictive potential barriers to trade in services.14 TheWTO in
12 See WTO, Council for Trade in Services, ‘Article VI:4 of the GATS: Disciplines on Domestic
Regulation Applicable to All Services’, Note by the Secretariat, S/C/W/96, 1 March 1999, p. 4.
13 WTO, WPDR, ‘Report of the Meeting Held on 1 April 2009’, S/WPDR/M/40.
14 P. Delimatsis, ‘Due Process and ‘‘Good’’ Regulation Embedded in the GATS – Disciplining
Regulatory Behaviour in Services through Article VI of the GATS’, Journal of International Economic
Law, 10(1) (2007), 15–17.
646 PANAG IOT I S DEL IMAT S I S
general does not interfere with Members’ regulatory sovereignty and this is ex-
pressed in no uncertain terms. In the GATS, this is made most obvious in the
structure of the agreement: while measures limiting market access or violating
national treatment are explicitly prohibited in sectors where commitments were
undertaken unless scheduled, the right to maintain or introduce origin-neutral
measures aimed at quality assurance is upheld and Members are not required to
eliminate such measures. Nevertheless, economic theory suggests – and practice
has shown – that Members always have a short-term incentive to ‘cheat’ while
their trading partners comply with their WTO obligations.15 Such measures,
because of the a priori WTO deference towards regulatory autonomy, are the
‘ ideal ’ gateway for a Member to substantiate its intention to circumvent the WTO
obligations. Therefore, rules governing such measures have to be agreed on if
market access guaranteed through specific commitments is to be effective.
In the Uruguay Round, the GATS drafters failed to agree on the content of an
instrument that would allow the minimization of the negative impact on trade of
regulatory conduct. At the end of that Round, negotiators fell short of concluding
the legal framework in four areas of rulemaking, that is domestic regulation,
emergency safeguards, government procurement, and subsidies. These areas
constitute the ‘built-in’ agenda for the ongoing services negotiations that began in
early 2000.
As to domestic regulation, notably Article VI:4 GATS incorporates a
legal mandate by requiring that Members adopt the necessary rules (so-called
‘disciplines’) that would ensure measures relating to qualification requirements
and procedures (QRP), licensing requirements and procedures (LRP), and tech-
nical standards (TS) are, inter alia, (a) based on objective and transparent criteria,
(b) not more burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of the service, and
(c) with respect to procedures, not in themselves a restriction on the supply of
a given service. Priority was given to professional services and the Working Party
on Professional Services (WPPS) was thereby established. The WPPS completed its
task by developing disciplines on domestic regulation in the accountancy sector
in December 1998.16 In May 1999, the Council for Trade in Services (CTS)
established the Working Party on Domestic Regulation (WPDR), which assumed
the work of WPPS and is charged with the development of meaningful and
coherent disciplines on domestic regulation, which would be horizontally appli-
cable (i.e. across services sectors). Through this legal mandate, Members are re-
quired to restore the balance between the three prongs leading to effective market
access (i.e. GATS Articles XVI, XVII, and VI) and establish regulatory disciplines
15 P. Delimatsis, International Trade in Services and Domestic Regulations – Necessity,
Transparency, and Regulatory Diversity (Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 41.
16 WTO, Trade in Services, ‘Disciplines on Domestic Regulation in the Accountancy Sector’, S/L/64,
17 December 1998.
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for measures relating to QRP, LRP, and TS, including the procedures for enforcing
these standards (‘ the covered measures ’).
Domestic regulation is the only area of rulemaking where tangible progress has
been witnessed during the ongoing round of services negotiations. Again, this is
not a coincidence, but an informed decision by Members to advance this agenda
item even with a rather apparent lack of enthusiasm for achieving progress in the
other negotiating areas at present.17 Absent border barriers in services trade, the
effectiveness of the rules on domestic regulation in services at the global level
determines the effectiveness of the GATS overall.
It also bears mention that, in their preferential trade agreements (PTAs), most
Members usually entrust the concretization of rules on domestic regulation to the
WTO. In the overwhelming majority of PTAs, even if liberalization in other
areas may be substantial,18 the negotiating parties find it intractable to go beyond
Article VI GATS when bilateral discussions focus on domestic regulation. In this
case, after essentially reproducing the wording of Article VI GATS in their bilateral
accord, they incorporate a clause which requires them to revise their discipline on
domestic regulation in services, based on the results of the negotiations under the
aegis of the WPDR. PTAs such as those between the United States and Singapore,19
the United States and Chile,20 Australia and Singapore,21 or the European Free
Trade Association (EFTA) and Chile22 highlight this trend.23 The semantics are
clear : Members recognized that collective action by means of multilateral coop-
eration was the only avenue suitable to address the issues raised in an efficient
and least trade-distorting manner. In an era of increasing preferentialism in trade
relations, this explicit, ‘against-the-preferential-odds’ delegation at the multi-
lateral level challenges conventional wisdom about the superiority of PTAs in
terms of rule-making and instead demonstrates the limits of preferential solutions
in several areas. It further confirms the extant attractiveness of the WTO as the
only forum that can achieve the application of certain rules across the board.
17 Anecdotal evidence suggests that a recent attempt by a Member representative to link further
progress in the negotiations on domestic regulations to advancements in agriculture and NAMA was
fiercely criticized. However, in the recent Ministerial Conference held in Geneva in December 2009,
several Members suggested that progress in services should go in tandem with other negotiating areas.
18 This, again, will often depend on the bargaining power of the parties involved (for instance US
PTAs tend to deliver more substantial results) or the level of ambition and the sectoral interests of the
parties involved. See C. Fink and M. Moliuevo, ‘East Asian Preferential Trade Agreements in Services:
Liberalization Content and WTO Rules’, World Trade Review, 7(4) (2008), 641. Also J. Marchetti and
M. Roy (eds.), Opening Markets for Trade in Services – Countries and Sectors in Bilateral and WTO
Negotiations (Cambridge University Press, 2009).
19 Art. 8.8:3 of the US–Singapore PTA.
20 Art. 11.8:3 of the US–Chile PTA.
21 Art. 7-11.5 of the Singapore–Australia FTA.
22 Art. 28 EFTA–Chile FTA.
23 Such PTAs also tend to require that PTA partners coordinate in these multilateral negotiations
within the WPDR.
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At the Hong KongMinisterial Conference in December 2005, Members pledged
to agree on a text that would incorporate concrete regulatory disciplines on non-
discriminatory non-quantitative domestic regulations before the end of the current
negotiating round.24 Members currently negotiate within the WPDR based on a
draft text and subsequent revisions prepared by the WPDR Chair and circulated in
the form of room documents. This secrecy is just another element reminiscent of
the delicate phase that negotiations on domestic regulation have entered.
Regulatory capture is just around the corner and domestic services industries do
not seem to have realized the full potential of the forthcoming disciplines.
The importance and ground-breaking nature of the forthcoming disciplines
is obvious: adherence to these disciplines when regulating the supply of services
through origin-neutral measures would reflect the minimum level of protection
and transparency from which service suppliers benefit globally.25 Once the forth-
coming disciplines are adopted, service suppliers will be benefiting from rights
that were not previously available to them – sometimes not even in their home
countries. The creation of these disciplines constitutes a tentative endeavour by
WTO Members to move away from the traditional negative integration approach
and achieve positive integration, at least as regards those measures affecting trade
in services which relate to qualifications, licensing, and technical standards.
Additionally, post-Doha the completion of the Article VI:4 mandate will bring
about national regulatory audits to ensure compliance with the ensuing regulatory
disciplines. This ‘screening’ exercise will facilitate trade by inducing domestic
regulatory reforms at all levels of government and by improving regulatory qual-
ity. It will also promote informal forms of regulatory cooperation among domestic
regulators and lead to minimum harmonization of domestic regulations, which
aim to ensure the quality of the services supplied. In the medium term, Members
will be identifying similarities between their regulatory systems in certain services
sectors and be aware of the costs of maintaining a rigid stance towards foreign
suppliers.
Thus, the GATS promotes a managed approximation of laws which will gen-
erate strong and justified pressures for mutual recognition agreements (MRAs).26
The repercussions are paramount: this regulatory programme under construction
at the global level will be infused into domestic counterparts. The adoption of
24 Annex C to the Hong KongMinisterial Declaration, adopted on 18 December 2005, WT/MIN(05)/
DEC, para 5.
25 In the case of intellectual property rights, Part III of the TRIPS Agreement also incorporates en-
forcement procedures which ‘provide for an internationally-agreed minimum standard which Members
are bound to implement in their domestic legislation’. See Appellate Body Report, United States – Section
211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998 (US–Section 211 Appropriations Act), WT/DS176/AB/R,
adopted 1 February 2002, DSR 2002:II, 589, paras. 206–7, 221.
26 Viewed from this angle, Article VI complements and serves the object and purpose of Article VII
GATS. See, generally, A. B. Zampetti, ‘Market Access through Mutual Recognition: The Promise and
Limits of GATS Article VII’, in P. Sauvé and R. M. Stern (eds.), GATS 2000: New Directions in Services
Trade Liberalization (Brookings Institution, 2000), pp. 283–306.
Concluding the WTO services negotiations on domestic regulation 649
procedural and substantive norms at the global level will increasingly constrain
the margin of manoeuvre of domestic regulators when regulating domestically.
The latter will no longer be merely national actors, but will have to assume an
additional role as agents of the GATS rules on domestic regulation to ensure
compliance and uniform application of these rules in all Members.27 This global
regime is aimed to protect the interests and concerns of other Members and foreign
service suppliers by ensuring the compliance of domestic regulators with these
globally applicable rules. In this respect, ensuring effective enforcement at the
domestic level becomes crucial, as explained in Section 6.
3. The draft disciplines on domestic regulation28
Members’ sovereign prerogative to regulate and to introduce new regulations
on the supply of services to pursue legitimate objectives is explicitly recognized
in the GATS Preamble and in paragraph 3 of the draft disciplines on domestic
regulation.29 The disciplines are neutral as to the regulatory approach chosen,
leaving ample scope for domestic regulators. Nevertheless, regulatory discretion is
not unlimited; rather, it is circumscribed by Article VI:4, which considers the
creation of effective, enforceable, and operationally useful regulatory disciplines,
an apposite remedy against Members’ incentives to circumvent multilateral ob-
ligations. Through the adoption of regulatory disciplines pursuant to Article VI:4,
the GATS essentially aims to facilitate drawing the line of equilibrium between
multilateral interest in progressive liberalization of trade in services and each
Member’s interest in preserving its regulatory autonomy.30
The disciplines constitute the first serious attempt, as well as a unique oppor-
tunity, to concretize the primary GATS objective and to achieve it in certain
categories of domestic regulations relating to qualifications, licensing, and tech-
nical standards. In what follows, we will proceed to a presentation of the most
important aspects of the proposed disciplines on domestic regulation. In the
second part of this section, we will attempt a first critical assessment of the
disciplines and suggest several effective ways to improve the proposed disciplines
on domestic regulation. In these efforts, we draw several lessons from the
European Union’s recent initiative for better regulation and simplification of
procedures in legislating the internal market of services, i.e. the infamous Services
Directive.31 Finally, we conclude this section with a critical evaluation of the
development provisions of the disciplines.
27 A.-M. Slaugther, A New World Order (Princeton University Press, 2005).
28 Our comments are based on the most recent draft text submitted by the WPDR Chairman. See
WPDR, ‘Disciplines on Domestic Regulation Pursuant to GATS Article VI:4’, Room Document, 20
March 2009 (on file with the author).
29 This right forms part of the object and purpose of the GATS. See Panel Report, US–Gambling,
paras 6.107–9 and 6.314–17.
30 cf. Panel Report, US–Gambling, para. 6.316.
31 Directive 2006/123 on services in the internal market (the Services Directive) [2006] OJ L 376/36.
650 PANAG IOT I S DEL IMAT S I S
3.1 An analysis of the draft disciplines on domestic regulation – focus on
improving procedures
The Draft incorporates regulatory disciplines that aim to enhance the objectivity
and transparency of domestic measures relating to licensing, qualifications, and
standards and ensure observance of contemporary dictates of due process in the
domestic regulatory making. Its scope is limited to measures that affect trade in
services in committed sectors.32 Additionally, it attempts to draw the line between
Article VI measures and measures falling under Articles XVI and XVII. While the
latter escape the purview of the disciplines, the manner in which Members ad-
minister (or apply)33 these measures would still be subject to the disciplines.34
Furthermore, the Draft requires that the covered measures be pre-established,
based on objective and transparent criteria, and relevant to the supply of the
service to which they apply. This provision hints at the overall objective of the
draft disciplines to limit the otherwise broad regulatory authority of Members,
avert regulatory arbitrariness and unnecessary bureaucracy, and ensure the
creation or preservation of a stable, predictable and trade-friendly regulatory
environment for service suppliers.
Depending on the category of measures at issue, the level of detail varies. The
overall structure and content of the Draft reveals Members’ willingness to focus
on the development and adoption of a workable set of global rules relating to
procedural issues when it comes to domestic regulations affecting trade in services.
The procedural novelties in the disciplines are significant and accord with the
overall contemporary trend of growing engagement with good governance prin-
ciples, such as transparency, participation, reasoned decision, availability of legal
remedies, and review.35 The procedural disciplines of the Draft are the most refined
and call for the simplification and streamlining of the applicable procedures to
ensure that they do not constitute in themselves a restriction on the supply of
services.36 In this sense, the draft disciplines elaborate on the procedural obliga-
tions set out in Articles III and VI GATS.
3.1.1 Procedural and regulatory transparency
The Draft contains fairly detailed provisions that streamline and guarantee trans-
parent application processes. Furthermore, the Draft requires that Members pub-
lish, or make otherwise publicly available, detailed information regarding the
32 This limitation of the coverage of the disciplines goes against the letter of Article VI:4. See
Delimatsis, above n. 15, pp. 187–189.
33 Cf. Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Selected Customs Matters (EC–Selected
Customs Matters), WT/DS315/AB/R, adopted 11 December 2006, DSR 2006:IX, 3791, paras. 224–6.
34 Cf. WTO, Council for Trade in Services (Special Session), ‘Economic Needs Tests’, Note by the
Secretariat, S/CSS/W/118, 30 November 2001, para. 7.
35 Cf. B. Kingsbury, N. Krisch, and R.B. Stewart, ‘The Emergence of Global Administrative Law’,
Law and Contemporary Problems, 68 (2005), 15.
36 Cf. Chapter II of the EU Services Directive on ‘administrative simplification’.
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covered measures. This information will, inter alia, relate to the procedures to be
followed or the timeframe for processing of applications, but also to the legal
content of the measures, such as licensing or qualification criteria. Such infor-
mation need not be notified to the WTO, but only published promptly,37 through
printed or electronic means. The Draft foresees extending to any service supplier
the use of enquiry and contact points created pursuant to Articles III and IV GATS
in the aftermath of the Uruguay Round, and thus detailed information could flow
through these points. To date, these government-to-government information
points have barely been used, as those who are the most interested in receiving this
type of information, that is the traders, do not have access to them.
The Draft, inter alia, urges countries to provide a single point of contact or
competent authority to deal with a supplier’s application (one-stop-shops), process
applications, and administer application procedures and examinations in an ob-
jective manner, and to ensure the reasonableness of fees requested. In case an
application for a licence or for assessment and verification of qualifications is dis-
missed, the authorities are required to inform the applicant in writing and without
undue delay of this dismissal and the timeframe for an appeal against this decision.
If requested to do so, the authorities have to explain the reasons that led to the
dismissal of the application, and a service supplier should in principle be able to
ascertain the reasons for a decision that has a negative affect.38 This give-reason
requirement is an essential good-governance obligation and diminishes authorities’
leeway for making arbitrary or unreasonable decisions.39
The amalgam of the transparency provisions contained in the forthcoming
regulatory disciplines constitutes a critical building block underpinning the further
liberalization of trade in services, as these provisions require regulatory reforms
and help identify trade-restrictive measures. The disciplines will also lead to
significant positive integration in the regulation of the covered measures and
guarantee minimum levels of legal certainty and due process.
3.1.2 Licensing and qualification requirements
Regarding licensing requirements, the disciplines merely call upon Members
to reflect on the need for using non-discriminatory residency requirements for
licensing and the existence of other instruments which could attain the public
policy objective pursued. This soft wording does not appear in the case of quali-
fication requirements. Residency requirements as part of qualification require-
ments are treated more strictly, as they are ruled out if they are a precondition for
37 For an analysis of the ‘prompt publication’ concept, see P. Delimatsis, ‘Article III GATS’, in
R. Wolfrum, P.-T. Stoll, and C. Feinäugle (eds.), Max-Planck Commentaries on World Trade Law,
Volume 6: WTO – Trade in Services (Brill Publishers, 2008), p. 97.
38 Cf. in the EU context, the landmark decisions onHeylens and Vlassopoulou. Case 222/86 Unected
v Heylens [1987] ECR 4097, paras. 14–16; and C-340/89, Vlassopoulou [1991] ECR I-2357, para. 17.
39 Cf. Appellate Body Report, US–Shrimp, para. 183. The requirement to give reasons is also very
useful for judicial review purposes. See M. Shapiro, ‘The Giving Reasons Requirement’, University of
Chicago Legal Forum (1992), 179.
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the assessment and verification of the competence of a given service supplier, un-
less they are scheduled as limitations to the national treatment obligation.40 In
more general terms, residency requirements have been discussed intensively
first within the WPPS and later within the WPDR. Discussions suggest that there
is no common rule of thumb as to when residency requirements can be regarded
as national treatment limitations and thus need to be scheduled. The fact that
rules on non-discriminatory residency requirements are included in the Draft
is welcome, as it will greatly contribute to the elimination of one of the major
barriers to international trade in services which service suppliers currently
encounter.
Furthermore, the Draft is more detailed with regard to qualification require-
ments and calls for fair and flexible assessment of qualifications and professional
experience. The disciplines also generalize Article VI:6 GATS to apply across
services sectors. The latter provision, as it stands, applies only to professional
services in which commitments were undertaken. In conducting this comparative
examination of qualifications and experience, the competent authorities should
satisfy themselves that the qualifications, including diplomas and practical train-
ing, are at least equivalent to those possessed by the national suppliers.41
Equivalence is not predicated upon the similarity of the different elements, but
upon their comparability. For the sake of comparison, Article VI:6 in its current
form has much more limited scope in that it does not explicitly impose any obli-
gation other than the verification of competences, such as establishing the equi-
valence between home country and host country requirements.42 This can be one of
the reasons for the current poor record of compliance with this obligation.
In the Draft, a prominent role is given to professional experience acquired as a
complement to diplomas and other educational qualifications, as the competent
authorities are required to take due consideration thereof when they verify the
competence of the applicants. Thus, the Draft takes a pragmatic, business-friendly
stance towards economic reality and mobility of human capital. The proposed
disciplines go so far as to offer the possibility of fulfilling any additional edu-
cational requirements in the home country or in a third country.
3.1.3 Licensing and qualification procedures
Simplifying procedures relating to granting a licence or evaluating qualifications is
one of themain objectives of the proposed disciplines, which endorse principles and
rules found in modern administrative states in several instances. Complex proce-
dures and manifold domestic authorities reviewing a single application by a service
supplier usually dissuade mobility and thus hinder trade in services. The European
40 For a discussion on residency requirements, see Delimatsis, above n. 15, pp. 195–196.
41 Cf. C-31/00, Dreessen [2002] ECR I-663, para. 24. A landmark case as to how such a comparison
can occur in practice in an EU Member State is the ECJ judgment of 10 December 2009 in the case
C-345/08, Peśla (not yet published).
42 See WTO, Council for Trade in Services, above n. 12, p. 3; also Delimatsis, above n. 14, pp. 47–48.
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Union (EU) experience is revealing:43 Within its Lisbon Strategy, it undertook
several steps to simplify and improve existing legislation (acquis communautaire),
to better design new regulation, and to reduce administrative and other burdens by
regularly contacting regulatory impact assessment.44 The EU ‘Better Regulation
Initiative’ is considered as central in completing the internal market.45
The Draft requires that the competent authorities enforcing licensing procedures
be impartial, operationally independent of, and not accountable to any supplier of
the services for which the licence is warranted. Due process and good governance
are the principles that inform the disciplines relating to licensing and qualification
procedures. The Draft advocates a streamlining and standardization of these
procedures and the diminution of regulatory arbitrariness and unnecessary red
tape and bureaucracy to the benefit of all service suppliers seeking to supply their
services in foreign markets. Creating one-stop-shops and clearly defining the stages
from the moment of application to the moment of administrative decision by the
competent authority are two important requirements of the disciplines.
3.1.4 Technical standards
With respect to technical standards, the Draft clarifies that such standards
also include the procedures relating to the enforcement of these standards.
Furthermore, it requires that Members take into account relevant international
standards, unless these would not achieve the national policy objective(s) pursued
in an effective and appropriate manner. This provision echoes Article 2.4 TBT,
the important difference being that under the TBT provision Members have an
obligation to use such standards as a basis for their technical regulations. This
provision is likely to replace Article VI:5(b) once the disciplines on domestic
regulation are adopted.
Additionally, the Draft encourages Members to harness the behaviour of
non-governmental bodies when they develop and apply domestic or international
standards, thereby recognizing the increasingly important role that non-
governmental standard-setting bodies can play in hindering access to the supply of
a given service, even if the standards they develop are mostly of a voluntary nature.
3.1.5 Institutional perspectives
The Draft equally contains institutional provisions. A new Committee on
Domestic Regulation is thereby created that will be responsible, not only for
43 European Commission, ‘Third Strategic Review of Better Regulation in the European Union’,
COM(2009)15, 28 January 2009.
44 See, among others, Mandelkern Group on Better Regulation – Final Report, 2001, available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/better_regulation/documents/mandelkern_report.pdf.
45 Similar initiatives have been launched earlier in other countries such as the US (‘reinventing
government’) or Canada (‘smart regulation’). The OECD has a multi-year programme on regulatory
reform, which culminated in the ‘OECD Guiding Principles for Regulatory Quality and Performance’
adopted in 2005. In the same year, APEC and OECD agreed on an ‘Integrated Checklist on Regulatory
Reform’.
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supervising the implementation of the prospective disciplines, but also for ensuring
adherence to the other obligations of Article VI.46 As a ‘double’ guarantee, the
Council for Trade in Services shall also review the operation of the disciplines if
one Member so requests.
3.2 Critical assessment of the disciplines and scope for improvement
3.2.1 Procedural and regulatory transparency
Transparency is a significant ‘protectionism revelation’ proxy. Enhanced
transparency is an object and purpose not only of the GATS, but of the WTO in
general.47 WPDR discussions on transparency have been intense and effective,
since several countries consider that this is one of the areas where rules applicable
across services sectors would seem sensible.48
Considering the potential administrative burden involved, the draft disciplines
use hortatory, best-endeavour language to initially encourage Members to publish
GATS Article VI:4-relevant measures in advance to enable service suppliers,
both foreign and domestic, to comment. Additionally, Members are encouraged to
address collectively in writing the substance of these comments.
Contrary to paragraph 6 of the draft accountancy disciplines, this ‘soft ’
requirement for prior comment procedures concerns all measures of general ap-
plication, and does not distinguish between measures that significantly affect trade
in services and measures that do not. Prior notice and comment procedures applied
at all levels of regulatory authority are conducive to the internationalization of
decision-making and increase the legitimacy, accountability, representativeness,
and – ultimately – acceptance of the proposed measures by the service suppliers.49
While allowing foreigners to play a role in domestic regulatory making goes
against conventional wisdom about sovereignty and may cause political tensions
domestically, positive integration certainly presupposes a partial transfer of
sovereign regulatory powers to a higher level of governance. Such a constellation
may lead to an increase in transaction costs in the short run, as it requires that
domestic authorities ensure the proper functioning of notice and comment proce-
dures. However, transaction costs would most likely diminish in the medium to
46 For an analysis of these obligations, see Delimatsis, above n. 1.
47 Panel Report,US–Gambling, para. 6.107. Also Appellate Body Report,United States – Restrictions
on Imports of Cotton and Man-made Fibre Underwear (US–Underwear), WT/DS24/AB/R, adopted
25 February 1997, DSR 1997:I, 11, p. 21; and Panel Report, China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights
and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products
(China–Publications and Audiovisual Products), WT/DS363/R and Corr.1, adopted 19 January 2010, as
modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS363/AB/R, para. 7.1219.
48 WTO,WPDR, ‘Report on the Meeting Held on 22 June 2005’, S/WPDR/M/30, 6 September 2005,
paras. 40ff.
49 J. Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the Rationalization of Society
(Beacon Press, 1981); D. Esty, ‘Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative
Law’, Yale Law Journal, 115 (2006), 1530.
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long run, as the risk of litigation will also become less likely. This is so because
prior notice and comment procedures can function as early warning systems and as
conflict avoidance techniques because foreign suppliers can raise their objections
at the point when any domestic regulation is drafted. Thus regulatory sovereignty
should be understood as embedded within a new concept of cooperative sover-
eignty and responsibility in a post-national setting50 that strives for a closer form of
positive integration and minimum harmonization, which do give voice to all those
affected by administrative decisions taken at all levels of governance.
Such procedures have been implemented at the national level in several countries
and have improved the function of domestic regulatory processes. The EU ex-
perience of introducing and gradually reinforcing a ‘culture of consultation and
dialogue’51 is instructive in this respect.52 Ensuring the coherence and consistency
of the procedures that precede the adoption of legislation leads to the more
active involvement of stakeholders and to more optimal regulatory results.53 This
is another example of the inspiration that international law draws from national
jurisdictions.54 The former borrows instruments from the toolbox of the domestic
regulatory frameworks in place and transforms – or better, adjusts – them before
crystallizing them into the form of an international obligation (in this case an
obligation to offer procedural participation rights to foreign constituents and
trading partners).55 More generally, participation in international institutions can
improve the functioning of domestic democracy by increasing openness, account-
ability, and transparency.56
However, the lack of a provision in the Draft equivalent to Article 2.5 TBT and
paragraph 5 of the draft accountancy disciplines requiring that Members, upon
request, explain the rationale behind domestic measures and their connection to a
50 Viewed through this prism, the exercise of sovereignty becomes a collective and cooperative en-
terprise calling for an anthropocentric approach. Cf. S. Hobe, ‘Statehood at the end of the 20th
Century – The Model of the ‘‘Open State’’ : A German Perspective’, Austrian Review of International and
European Law, 2 (1997), 127.
51 European Commission (2001), ‘European Governance – AWhite Paper’, COM(2001)428. See also
Art. 11:2 of the Lisbon Treaty. See, however, T-135/96, UEAPME v Council [1998] ECR II-2335.
52 Also C. Harlow, ‘Global Administrative Law: The Quest for Principles and Values’, European
Journal of International Law, 17(1) (2006), 201. The EU adopts this stance in its external relations as well.
See European Commission, ‘On the External Dimension of the Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs:
Reporting on Market Access and Setting the Framework for More Effective International Regulatory
Cooperation’, COM(2008)874.
53 European Commission (2002), ‘Towards a Reinforced Culture of Consultation and
Dialogue – General Principles and Minimum Standards for Consultation of Interested Parties by the
Commission’, COM(2002)704.
54 Some EU law scholars would even argue for an incremental ‘Europeanisation’ of international law.
See F. Snyder (ed.), The Europeanisation of Law : The Legal Effects of European Integration (Hart
Publishing, 2000).
55 See S. Cassese, ‘Global Standards for National Administrative Procedure’, Law and Contemporary
Problems, 68 (2005), 121.
56 R. Keohane, S. Macedo, and A. Moravcsik, ‘Democracy-EnhancingMultilateralism’, International
Law and Justice Working Paper No. 2007/4, New York University.
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legitimate objective weakens the ‘bite ’ of the transparency provisions included in
the draft disciplines. In the categories of measures covered by the disciplines where
the scope of regulatory discretion is virtually unlimited, such a provision would
significantly facilitate the distinction between necessary and unnecessary impedi-
ments to services trade. It would also facilitate the settlement of disputes, as it
would shift the burden of proof to the regulating (i.e. responding) party. Even so,
informal requests will in all likelihood be directed to the host countries when
complaints are filed domestically, leading to consultations and, if necessary, to
recourse to the dispute settlement proceedings.
3.2.2 Licensing and qualification requirements
As underscored earlier, the Draft merely calls upon Members to reflect on the
need for using non-discriminatory residency requirements for licensing. Residency
requirements are, however, treated more strictly when they relate to qualification
requirements, as they are ruled out if they are a precondition for the assessment
and verification of the competence of a given service supplier unless they are
scheduled as limitations to the national treatment obligation.57
This obligation, as it is drafted now in the section of the Draft relating to
qualification requirements, begs the question of whether the use or existence of
residency requirements overall is practically precluded. In addition, it is not
clear whether residency can be a prerequisite for sitting examinations. In the draft
accountancy disciplines, the text states in no uncertain terms that this is not
allowed.58 It would be helpful if Members were to clarify this provision to also
outlaw any residency requirements for sitting examinations. For instance, the
EU Services Directive is clearer in this respect in considering as prohibited any
requirement that service suppliers be resident within the territory.59
With regard to equivalence of qualifications, the Draft essentially excludes
the possibility for domestic authorities to request full requalification of service
suppliers, seeking the recognition of equivalence of their qualifications. Thus, the
Draft goes far beyond the highly unsatisfactory provision relating to equivalence
contained in paragraph 19 of the draft accountancy disciplines and thus demon-
strates the level of maturity reached within the negotiating group (the WPPS and
later the WPDR) dealing with the Article VI:4 negotiations since the end of
the Uruguay Round. According to the Draft, professional experience and other
qualifications should be evaluated and compensate for a possible deficiency of
academic qualifications. This liberal approach should be applauded. Nevertheless,
the Draft does not echo the far-reaching obligations contained in Articles 4.1
SPS or 2.7 TBT according to which (albeit in the TBT in a somewhat smoother
57 For a discussion on residency requirements, see Delimatsis, above n. 15, pp. 195–196.
58 See WTO, Trade in Services, above n. 16, para. 24.
59 See Art. 14:1(b) of the EU Services Directive. However, this prohibition is a corollary of the dif-
ferent approach that the EU adopts, which is based on achieving an internal market of services.
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manner) Members are required to accept the measures of SPS or TBT measures of
other Members as being equivalent to their own, even if they differ. Pursuant
to Article 4.1 SPS, the importing Member has to accept such equivalence if the
exporting Member can demonstrate that the attainment of the desired level of
protection domestically is ascertained. Article 2.7 TBT, however, suggests
that ‘positive consideration’ shall be given to accepting equivalence, unless
the importing Member believes that such measures do not adequately attain the
objectives of their own measures. In this case, it appears that the burden of proof
will be on (or at least easily shift to) the importing Member. Members may want to
consider these TBT and SPS provisions in the specific case of technical standards.
As a last point, it is worth mentioning that the case for horizontal – as opposed
to sectoral – disciplines on domestic regulation is even stronger when it comes
to qualification requirements and procedures. In the EU context, early sectoral
attempts failed to achieve the desired liberalization and to enhance mobility of
service suppliers. This changed with the adoption of a general system for the
recognition of qualifications around the early 90s.60
3.2.3 Licensing and qualification procedures
A significant novelty of the draft is the creation of one-stop-shops. This require-
ment will facilitate mobility of service suppliers, especially in federal countries
where competences were earlier distributed along the various levels of govern-
ment. Added value is also evident in those cases where the point of contact is also
the authority directly competent to issue the documents necessary for the supplier
to access a service activity.
The provisions of the Draft on licensing and qualification procedures build on
the existing transparency obligations within the GATS as well as on Article VI:2.
According to the Draft, the competent authorities enforcing the licensing proce-
dures are explicitly required to be impartial, operationally independent of, and not
accountable to any supplier of the services for which the licence is warranted.
Surprisingly, however, this obligation does not apply to the domestic authorities in
charge of verifying and assessing qualifications. This omission is inexplicable and
creates unnecessary confusion regarding the motives of the drafters. Operational
impartiality and independence of the competent domestic authorities administer-
ing domestic qualification procedures seem to be equally essential, as in the case of
licensing procedures. Consider, for instance, a committee, composed exclusively of
domestic lawyers, verifying qualifications of lawyers. The danger of prejudiced
and negative decisions appears to be relatively high.61 In this case, one would
60 The EU rules relating to the recognition of professional qualifications are now contained in the
Directive 2005/36, OJ L 255/22. Also C. Nicolaidis, ‘Globalization with Human Faces: Managed Mutual
Recognition and the Free Movement of Professionals’, in F. Schioppa (ed.), The Principle of Mutual
Recognition in the European Integration Process (Palgrave, 2004).
61 Cf. Panel Report, Argentina – Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides and Import of
Finished Leather (Argentina–Hides and Leather), WT/DS155/R and Corr.1, adopted 16 February 2001,
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expect that other experts such as judges, prosecutors, and civil servants from the
Ministry of Justice would partake in such verification procedures.
Another reason to criticize this imbalance is the nuanced definition of qualifi-
cations vis-à-vis licensing adopted in the aftermath of the Uruguay Round.
Licensing requirements are defined as ‘substantive requirements, other than
qualification requirements’. Hence a requirement relates to licensing only to the
extent that it does not relate to qualifications. The aforementioned imbalance
would create an incentive for the responding party to ‘name’ all requirements as
being qualifications rather than licensing requirements to avoid the administrative
burden of an obligation to create impartial and independent authorities. Recall
here that while juridical persons are subject to licensing requirements only, natural
persons can be subject to both licensing and qualifications requirements.
Therefore, the latter may be subject to unjustifiable restrictions, which could
potentially dissuade them from offering their services. This can potentially create
an unjustified imbalance to the detriment of natural persons.
Of course, a possible rationale behind the requirement of establishing
impartial and operationally independent authorities relates to the legacy of
regulating network industries where typically a licence is warranted in order to
be able to supply a given service. Even so, however, this fails to explain why
authorities verifying qualifications should not be equally required to be impartial
and operationally independent. As it is, the Draft unduly confounds terms and
situations and leaves plenty of room for misinterpretations and sophisticated
legalistic creativity that can have harmful effects on the expansion of trade in
services. Members would be well-advised here to opt for simplification and level-
ling of the playing field as regards qualifications versus licensing. An additional
element to consider is the utility of having different definitions and categorizations
for licensing and qualifications. For the sake of comparison, the EU Services
Directive avoids leaving too much room for misleading interpretations by adopt-
ing a sweeping definition of the terms ‘requirement’ and ‘authorization scheme’.62
3.2.4 Technical standards
Regarding technical standards, the Draft echoes Article 2.4 TBT, but differs from
it in that Members are required to take into account (rather than use) relevant
international standards (or parts thereof) as a basis for their technical standards,
unless they constitute ineffective or inappropriate means for achieving the public
policy objective pursued. GATS negotiators are wary of accepting an obligation
which would be as strong as the one contained in Article 2.4 TBT. This cautious
approach seems to have certain advantages, notably when one takes into account
the lack of representativeness and thus legitimacy that may characterize the
DSR 2001:V, 1779, paras. 11.91, 11.100. For a similar case in the EU see Case C-250/03, Mauri [2005]
ECR I-1267.
62 See Article 4:6 and 4:7 as well as Recital 39 of the EU Services Directive.
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processes that lead to the adoption of certain international standards. On the other
hand, however, this stance creates a precarious vicious circle in that Members do
not have any incentive to partake seriously and actively in international standard-
setting efforts.
In EC–Sardines, the Appellate Body spelt out the scope of Article 2.4 TBT. First,
it agreed with the Panel that a standard is relevant when ‘it has a bearing upon,
relates to or is pertinent to’ the contested measure. It further found that a given
measure cannot be considered to be using an international standard as a basis if the
content of that measure contradicts it. Rather, the relevant international standard
should be used ‘as the principal constituent or fundamental principle for the
purpose of enacting the domestic measure, alluding to a very strong and close
relationship between the two’.63 Furthermore, the Appellate Body underscored that
it is for the complainant to adduce evidence demonstrating the effectiveness and
appropriateness of the international standard at issue.64 This position is counter-
intuitive : the Appellate Body was hard-pressed in its attempt to reject the argument
that the complainant is the informed party in such a case and therefore better-suited
to adduce evidence against the appropriateness of a given international standard.
This preference for the wording adopted in TBT over that adopted in SPS is yet
another element demonstrating Members’ willingness to make the task of the
complaining party in establishing a prima facie case even more difficult.
Additionally, the Draft incorporates a best-effort provision encouraging Mem-
bers to ensure maximum transparency when non-governmental bodies develop
and apply domestic or international standards. Similar provisions, albeit with a
stronger ‘bite ’, are included in Articles 3.1 TBT and 13 SPS. Non-governmental
bodies can play a decisive role, as several services sectors are self-regulated by non-
governmental bodies. Delegation of public power to private parties upgrades the
role of the latter regarding market access and supply of a given service. Therefore,
close monitoring and transparency of their activities can allow for objective and
accelerated entry into a profession or industry, while preserving and enhancing the
desired level of quality of the service supplied. Members could be even bolder in
this regard and adopt principles that non-governmental bodies should abide by.
For this, they could get inspiration from the TBT Code of Good Practice.
This provision on the development of standards alludes to the ever-increasing
role of non-state actors in this field. The fact that such standards were mostly of a
voluntary nature led many to believe that the impact of these activities is minimal.
However, notably, after the adoption of the TBT and SPS Agreements, which
create an obligation for WTO Members to use international standards and a
presumption of WTO-consistency for those Members adopting such standards,
standard-setting activities by non-governmental bodies have taken centre stage.
63 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines (EC–Sardines),
WT/DS231/AB/R, adopted 23 October 2002, DSR 2002:VIII, 3359, paras. 240–5
64 Ibid., paras. 275, 282, 287.
660 PANAG IOT I S DEL IMAT S I S
While non-binding, standardization processes resemble lawmaking. As their role
in determining the very access to markets becomes more prominent as a result of
globalised markets and the concomitant collapse of the rigid public versus private
divide,65 demands for improvements in the efficiency, transparency, legitimacy,
and accountability of standardization bodies have grown in prominence.66
3.2.5 Institutional perspectives
The Draft creates a Committee on Domestic Regulation which will be supervising
the implementation of the disciplines. Nevertheless, a serious weakness of the
institutional part of the Draft is that it neither requires nor formalizes close
cooperation or mutual assistance between national regulators of services indus-
tries. For several categories of service suppliers, establishing a type of cooperation
(even if only loose, initially) would allow for more effective supervision of service
activities globally. For instance, assessment of qualifications could be undertaken
more efficiently if a type of network was in place that would allow communication
and exchange of information between the authority in charge of assessing qualifi-
cations in the host country and the authority that emitted the document certifying
qualifications in the home country. In this respect, the WTO Secretariat could
maintain a repository of the domestic competent authorities for all the subjects
relating to licensing, qualifications, or technical standards. Members would be
required to notify such information to the Secretariat, which would store all this
information electronically to allow for expedited identification of the relevant
counterparts in other Members.
3.3 The development dimension of the draft disciplines on domestic
regulation – missing another opportunity?
The Draft includes several development-friendly provisions such as phased-in
periods for developing countries, the duration of which remains to be decided, and
the obligation to provide technical assistance to developing countries and LDCs.
Both the administrative burden and the lack of the necessary regulatory capacities
make such provisions indispensable.However, it is doubtful whether exempting the
LDCs from applying the rules on domestic regulation described above constitutes
an approach which is commensurate with the developmental needs of these
countries and conducive to the development of their service industries.67 Instead of
creating concrete incentives for these countries to improve their regulatory and
institutional frameworks governing the supply of services domestically and for
developed countries to assist in this effort, the Draft merely adopts a purportedly
respectful but static stance that will have dubious benefits in the long run.
65 See, generally, C. Cutler, Private Power and Global Authority – Transnational Merchant Law and
the Global Political Economy (Cambridge University Press, 2003).
66 H. Schepel, The Constitution of Private Governance (Hart Publishing, 2005).
67 See, along these lines, R. Adlung, ‘Services Liberalization from a WTO/GATS Perspective: In
Search of Volunteers’, WTO Staff Working Paper ERSD-2009-05, 2009, p. 18.
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The development provisions of the Draft recognize the importance of inter-
national standard-setting for increased market access especially in developed-
country markets, technology transfer, and increased trade. This is not unrelated
to the experience from the implementation of the TBT and SPS Agreements. Thus,
the Draft requires that developed country Members, when they design their
technical assistance programmes directed towards developing countries and LDCs,
assist in the establishment of technical standards by such countries, but also that
they facilitate the participation of these Members in the relevant international
standard-setting organizations. Thus, à la Articles 11.2 TBT and 10.4 SPS, the
Draft alludes to the usefulness of well-intentioned standardization that reflects the
interests and views of a broader group of countries and thus can be considered as
sufficiently legitimate.
The previous discussion reveals once more the close links of the adoption of the
Article VI:4 regulatory disciplines with the expansion of trade through mode 4.
Qualification or licensing requirements and procedures that ensure objectivity,
transparency, and impartiality ; promote administrative simplification and the
expedited clearance of applications; and that prevent fees being set at prohibitive
levels constitute essential prerequisites for any further increase in international
labour flows.68 However, as emphasized earlier, there are several instances where
the Draft appears to offer conditions under licensing procedures that are more
favourable than qualification procedures. For instance, while in both cases
Members are encouraged to accept certified copies instead of original documents,69
the Draft recognizes the efficiency of allowing electronic applications only for
those relating to licensing. This red-tape-avoidance requirement is equally im-
portant in the case of verification of qualifications and therefore should also apply
to domestic procedures relating to the evaluation of qualifications. Currently,
several countries are in the process of further simplifying their legislation and
reducing unnecessary bureaucracy. For instance, the EU has pursued a strategy
that aims at the identification of overlaps, gaps, inconsistencies, obsolete measures,
and the potential for reducing regulatory burdens, regardless of whether applica-
tions of natural or legal persons are at stake.70 While mainly driven by domestic
forces, such initiatives have a positive spillover on foreign suppliers seeking access
to those markets.
68 See S. Chaudhuri, A. Mattoo, and R. Self, ‘Moving People to Deliver Services: How can the WTO
help?’, Journal of World Trade, 38(3) (2004), 365.
69 At the EU level, the ECJ has consistently found that requiring original documentation from appli-
cants is disproportionate to the objective pursued relating to the protection of the public interest that
service suppliers indeed have certain qualifications attested by a recognized diploma, and that other forms
of evidence which are less burdensome such as certified copies or even simple copies can allow the at-
tainment of the public policy objective. See C-298/99, Commission v Italy [2002] ECR I-3129, paras
37–39.
70 See Protocol No. 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, annexed
to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU); also European Commission (2009),
‘Third strategic review of Better Regulation in the European Union’, COM(2009)15 final.
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Overall, the draft disciplines on domestic regulation are a critical, tentative step
towards ‘good’ regulation, as they promote good governance. The Draft attempts
to codify in a single text the proposals that have been submitted by Members.
Nevertheless, it seems not to be taking account of the most ambitious proposals
submitted and this has raised considerable controversy within the WPDR as to
whether the text is balanced overall.71 The Draft can certainly be improved
along the lines we suggested earlier. On the other hand, the Draft can be
development-friendly in a more active manner. Whereas implementation of the
draft disciplines will be a critical challenge for developing countries, regulatory
cooperation and information exchange as well as technical assistance at an inter-
state level becomes paramount, notably when implementation is compromised by
information deficits, ignorance, or collective action problems.72 A streamlined
approach is all the more necessary for those countries whose constitutional and
administrative law tradition may not include this type of sophisticated procedure
and this level of openness.
4. A proposal for a necessity test applicable to all services sectors
In the case of origin-neutral measures, the quest for a balance between the com-
peting rights of expanding multilateral trade in services, on the one hand,
and avoiding any circumvention of market access commitments and GATS sub-
stantive obligations, on the other, can only be successful if proxies are developed
which the WTO adjudicator can use.73 In the GATS, vernacular so-called
‘necessity tests ’ have long been used in other WTO agreements as the prevailing
benchmarks for identifying and disciplining unduly burdensome or protectionist
regulatory behavior.74 Because Article VI:4 seeks the creation of disciplines en-
suring that the covered measures do not constitute unnecessary barriers to trade in
services, the creation of a horizontal necessity test lies at the heart of this man-
date.75 Thus, a textual interpretation of the mandate contemplated by Article VI:4
already hints at the need to agree on what would be unnecessarily restrictive of
trade in services ; in other words, a necessity test. Such a test would allow the
attenuation of the most egregious requirements and procedures entrenched in
domestic regulatory regimes and, in the medium-to-long term, would lead to ex-
tensive recognition of foreign qualifications, licensing, or standards, since domestic
71 See WTO, WPDR, above n 13.
72 W. Mattli and T. Büthe, ‘Global Private Governance: Lessons from a National Model of Setting
Standards in Accounting’, Law and Contemporary Problems, 68 (2005), 226–227.
73 Also P. Delimatsis, ‘Determining the Necessity of Domestic Regulations in Services – The Best is
Yet to Come’, European Journal of International Law, 19(2) (2008), 365.
74 Also M. Krajewski, ‘Article VI GATS (Domestic Regulation)’, in R. Wolfrum, P.-T. Stoll, and
C. Feinäugle (eds.), above n. 37, p. 178.
75 A positive analysis of the mandate and a critical review of the concept of necessity, its interpretation
by the WTO judiciary, and the relevant doctrine is offered in Delimatsis, above n. 73. In this section,
we rather focus on a normative analysis of a possible framework that endorses a necessity test applicable
to all services sectors.
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authorities will be called upon to compare the equivalence of foreign requirements
or processes.76
To avoid judicial activism77 and interpretive loans from other WTO agreements
which may not be apposite in the context of services, it is submitted that Members
should consider the adoption of a horizontally applicable necessity test that would
be clear, effective, and operationally useful. Surely, such a test would include
several concepts that accommodate the domestic demands for regulatory flexi-
bility. While constructive ambiguity has traditionally been deemed beneficial and
allowed agreement to be reached among Members,78 in this case, it can jeopardize
the long-term viability of the regulatory disciplines and therefore intensive
endeavours to clarify ex ante the content of necessity in services can be essential.
It is argued that a necessity test drafted along the following lines could enjoy a
‘critical mass’ of support :
In sectors where specific commitments are undertaken, Members shall ensure
that measures relating to qualification requirements and procedures, licensing
requirements and procedures and technical standards are not prepared, adopted,
applied, or administered with a view to creating unnecessary barriers to trade in
services. For this purpose, Members shall ensure that these measures are (a) based
on objective and transparent criteria, such as competence and the ability to sup-
ply a service; (b) not more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a national
policy objective,* including ensuring the quality of the service; and (c) in the case
of licensing and qualification procedures, not in themselves a restriction on the
supply of the service.
Members shall endeavour to ensure that measures relating to qualification
requirements and procedures, licensing requirements and procedures and
technical standards in sectors where commitments have not been undertaken do
not constitute unnecessary barriers to trade in services.
* A measure falling under this provision cannot be considered more trade-
restrictive than necessary, unless there is another, reasonably available
alternative measure that would equally attain the objective pursued and which is
significantly less trade-restrictive. When evaluating the reasonable availability of
an alternative measure, Panels shall take into account several factors such as
economic and technical feasibility, the associated risks, or the creation of any
undue burden to the regulating Member, including prohibitive costs, substantial
administrative resources, costly technologies, or advanced know-how.
76 Recognition has here a broad meaning to also incorporate cases where requirements and procedures
or standards, while different, are considered as equivalent because they equally achieve the desired level of
protection or ensure the quality of the service supplied.
77 For a study suggesting that a shift of regulatory authority is occuring within the WTO to the benefit
of the judicial branch, see J. Goldstein and R. Steinberg, ‘Regulatory Shift: The Rise of Judicial
Liberalization at the WTO’, UCLA Law and Economics Research Paper No. 07-15, 2007.
78 Cf. Panel Report, Mexico – Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services (Mexico–Telecoms),
WT/DS204/R, adopted 1 June 2004, DSR 2004:IV, 1537, para. 7.3.
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The proposed test adopts an open-ended list of legitimate objectives, including
ensuring the quality of the service delivered, which a Member may want to pursue.
In this test, the covered measures should not aim to unduly hamper trade
in services, starting from the stage at which they are prepared and up to the stage
of application or administration. Nevertheless, contrary to the necessity test
adopted in the draft accountancy disciplines,79 the proposed necessity test, which
is meant to be generally applicable, does not cover the effects of the covered
measures.
Traditionally, GATT/WTO law is not concerned with trade effects in that
no evidence on this score is required for a violation of a WTO provision to be
established.80 Furthermore, the ‘aims and effects ’ doctrine that was developed in
the GATT years81 was not endorsed by the Appellate Body in the WTO years, as
exemplified by US–Gasoline and EC–Bananas III. Instead, the WTO judiciary has
advanced the concept of ‘protective application’, which focuses on the design,
architecture, and revealing structure of a measure.82 In the proposed necessity test,
a proper identification of protectionist intent (‘with a view to’) would also warrant
a thorough scrutiny of the design, architecture, and structure of the measure.
In the proposed necessity test, the quest for alternatives is intentionally
‘managed’ to allow for a certain room for manoeuvre for the regulators and
allay their concern of conceding regulatory autonomy.83 Indeed, the proposed
interpretive footnote aims to qualify or narrow the pool of measures that can
be regarded as alternatives and combines previous WTO rulings on necessity,
notably the Appellate Body’s findings in EC – Asbestos,84 US – Gambling,85 and
79 WTO, Trade in Services, above n. 16, para. 2.
80 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Japan–Alcoholic Beverages II),
WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, adopted 1 November 1996, DSR 1996:I, 97, p. 16;
also GATT Panel Report, United States – Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances
(US–Superfund), L/6175, adopted 17 June 1987, BISD 34S/136, para. 5.2.2.
81 GATT Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages (US–Malt
Beverages), DS23/R, adopted 19 June 1992, BISD 39S/206; GATT Panel Report,United States – Taxes on
Automobiles, DS31/R, 11 October 1994, unadopted. See also R. Hudec, ‘GATT/WTO Constraints on
National Regulation: Requiem for an ‘‘Aim and Effects’’ Test’, International Lawyer, 619 (1998), at 626.
82 This was regarded as leading to a resurrection of the aims and effects test. See A. Porges and
J. Trachtman, ‘Robert Hudec and Domestic Regulation: The Ressurection of ‘‘Aim and Effects’’ ’, Journal
of World Trade, 4 (2003), 783; also E. Leroux, ‘Eleven Years of GATS Case Law: What Have we
Learned?’, Journal of International Economic Law, 10(4) (2007), 749, at 780.
83 Cf. J. Trachtman, ‘Lessons for the GATS from Existing WTO Rules on Domestic Regulation’, in
A. Mattoo and P. Sauvé (eds.), Domestic Regulation and Service Trade Liberalization (World Bank/
Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 68–69.
84 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-
Containing Products (EC–Asbestos), WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2001, DSR 2001:VII, 3243,
para. 174.
85 Appellate Body Report, Dominican Republic – Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal
Sale of Cigarettes (Dominical Republic–Import and Sale of Cigarettes),WT/DS302/AB/R, adopted 19May
2005, DSR 2005:XV, 7367, para. 70.
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Brazil – Tyres.86 It bears mention that the inclusion of this necessity test would not
affect the development-friendly provisions described above, such as phase-in per-
iods for the application of the disciplines to developing countries or the exemption
for LDCs. As noted earlier, however, the forthcoming disciplines, and the appli-
cation of the principle of necessity in particular, can lead to the improvement of the
efficiency and trade-responsiveness of any domestic regulatory framework.
In addition, Members could contemplate the possibility of adopting an inter-
pretive rule, suggesting that the existence of doubt concerning the availability or
effectiveness of a less-trade-restrictive and reasonably available measure should
benefit the respondent in accordance with the maxim in dubio mitius. Although
such a statement seems already to be reflected in the WTO case-law, Members,
especially those which regard the inclusion of a necessity test with suspicion, may
consider as a relief the introduction of such a rule to the forthcoming disciplines.
As it stands, the Draft is unbalanced in that it focuses mainly on the procedural
aspects of the Article VI:4 mandate, but it neglects the equally important and clear
substantive aspect of the mandate enshrined in Article VI:4(b) GATS. Hence, not
incorporating a necessity test in the future disciplines under Article VI:4 would go
against the letter and spirit of the Members’ legal mandate.87 More crucially,
however, it would cast doubt on the effective enforcement of the prospective dis-
ciplines in the future. In the absence of a necessity test, the WTO adjudicator,
when called upon to rule over the consistency of a domestic regulation measure
with the disciplines, could use its own benchmarks or a sort of test based on the
principle of necessity, since the latter principle will be creeping into the disciplines
anyway, as we discuss in the next section. This, nonetheless, would mean that
Members have missed the unique opportunity to design themselves a necessity test
that would encompass concepts and elements that allow for more flexibility when
regulating.
Another fact which strongly calls for the adoption of a precise, effective,
and enforceable necessity test is that the WTO adjudicator will read all
applicable GATS provisions, i.e. both Article VI:4 as it stands and the new dis-
ciplines in a way that gives meaning to all of them harmoniously, in accordance
with the fundamental principle of effectiveness.88 Disregarding the utmost
objective of the legal mandate enshrined in Article VI:4, which is to ensure
that measures relating to LRP, QRP, and TS do not constitute ‘unnecessary
86 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres (Brazil–Retreaded
Tyres), WT/DS332/AB/R, adopted 17 December 2007, DSR 2007:IV, 1527, paras. 156, 171, 174–5.
87 In this direction, see Australia’s intervention in WTO, WPDR, ‘Report of the Meeting held on 19
and 20 June 2006’, S/WPDR/M/35, 14 August 2006, paras. 7–8, and Switzerland’s position in WTO,
WPDR, above n. 13, para. 10.
88 Cf. Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear
(Argentina–Footwear (EC)), WT/DS121/AB/R, adopted 12 January 2000, DSR 2000:I, 515, para. 81;
Appellate Body Report, Korea – Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products
(Korea–Dairy), WT/DS98/AB/R, adopted 12 January 2000, DSR 2000:I, 3, para. 81.
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barriers to trade in services’, would amount to an interpretation that reduces parts
of the GATS to ‘redundancy or inutility ’,89 contrary to the principle of effet utile
to which the WTO adjudicator adheres. At a minimum, Article VI:4 in its
current form would be considered as context when interpreting the regulatory
disciplines.90 Can such a constellation be considered as judicial activism? The
question should be answered in the negative. Already the first paragraph of the
Draft provides that Members have agreed on regulatory disciplines ‘pursuant
to Article VI:4 of the GATS’. This means that the Draft actually hints at the
interpretation by the WTO adjudicating bodies of the regulatory disciplines in
the aforementioned manner. Therefore, it appears that necessity will form part of
the interpretive tools in the toolbox of the WTO adjudicator regarding measures
falling under Article VI:4, regardless of whether the disciplines incorporate a
necessity test.
5. The unavoidable adoption of a necessity test
For various Members, including the United States, Brazil, and several developing
countries and LDCs, the inclusion of a necessity test in the draft disciplines on
domestic regulation appears to be regarded as a deal breaker. Due to these objec-
tions to the application of the principle of necessity across services sectors, the most
recent Draft replaces the requirement that measures be ‘not more burdensome
than necessary’ to ensure the quality of a service with the requirement that
the covered measures should not constitute ‘disguised restrictions on trade in
services’. Furthermore, these measures should be ‘relevant to the supply of
the services to which they apply’. Thus the necessity test has been replaced by a
‘disguised trade restriction’ test and a ‘relevance’ test. We analyse each of these
two types of tests in turn.
The ‘disguised trade restriction’ test is reminiscent of the language (and the test)
of the chapeau of Articles XX GATT and XIV GATS.91 Consistent GATT/WTO
case-law suggests that the concept of a ‘disguised restriction to trade’ has been
associated with discrimination and the manner in which a certain measure is
applied or administered.92 In US–Gasoline, the Appellate Body emphasized that
concealed or unannounced restriction does not exhaust the term ‘disguised trade
89 Cf. Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and the
Exportation of Dairy Products (Canada–Dairy), WT/DS103/AB/R, WT/DS113/AB/R and Corr.1, adop-
ted 27 October 1999, DSR 1999:V, 2057, para. 133; Appellate Body Report, United States – Continued
Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (US–Offset Act (Byrd Amendment)), WT/DS217/AB/R,
WT/DS234/AB/R, adopted 27 January 2003, DSR 2003:I, 375, para. 271.
90 The same applies to the role of Article VI:5 GATS.
91 Similar tests are to be found in Articles 2.3 and 5.5 SPS or VII:3 GATS.
92 Cf. the chapeau of Article XIV GATS or para. 5(d) of the Telecoms Annex; also T. Cottier, P.
Delimatsis, and N. Diebold, ‘Article XIV’, in Wolfrum, Stoll, and Feinäugle (eds.), above n. 37, p. 325.
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restriction’.93 This term clearly includes disguised discrimination and it can be read
as also encompassing restrictions resulting in arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimi-
nation. However, WTO case-law also suggests that disguised trade restriction can
exist even where there is no discrimination. This seems to be the intent of the
WPDR negotiators who advance this language, i.e. to cover measures which, while
not discriminating de jure or de facto, still constitute disguised trade restrictions,
that is restrictions that are not merely inadvertent or unavoidable, but rather
foreseeable violations of WTO obligations.94 The choice of this term will inevi-
tably lead the WTO adjudicator to interpret it according to previous WTO case-
law, which classified as disguised trade restrictions several acts or omissions, such
as the treatment of similarly situated trading partners in a different manner; the
lack of serious, good faith consultations with other trading partners (or, alterna-
tively, with some of them, but not others) to find a commonly agreed solution; or
the fact that significant costs that are only incumbent on the exporters are not
taken into account when regulating, while the costs that domestic producers bear
are. Hence, just as with the application of a necessity test, under the new ‘disguised
trade restriction’ test, the pursuit of less trade-restrictive alternatives and the
comparison of regulatory conduct in similar situations will be important evidence
for the WTO adjudicator. Therefore, the proposed test in its application will be
interpreted as a sort of necessity test.
By the same token, a ‘relevance’ test would be construed as a ‘soft ’ necessity
test. An interpretation along the lines of the US–Shrimp case law regarding
Article XX(g) seems plausible. This means that the measures adopted need not be
necessary, but they should be at least directly connected with, or primarily aimed
at, the objective pursued and this connection should be a close and real one.95
This test would again operate similarly to a necessity test, notably if we consider
the judicial restraint in cases involving objectives of vital importance and the
description of necessity as a continuum in Korea–Beef.96
In sum, it is submitted that these two tests that were aimed at replacing the
unjustifiably tarnished necessity test may still be interpreted through recourse
to concepts that are inherently associated with the principle of necessity under
the GATT/WTO. Therefore, instead of denying the need for the inclusion of a
necessity test in the forthcoming rules harnessing domestic regulations, negotiators
may want to concentrate their efforts on finding the best recipe for a wording that
will gather broad support.
93 Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline
(US–Gasoline), WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted 20 May 1996, DSR 1996:I, 3, p. 25.
94 Ibid, p. 28.
95 Appellate Body Report,United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products
(US–Shrimp), WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998, DSR 1998:VII, 2755, paras. 136, 141.
96 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef
(Korea–Beef), WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R, adopted 10 January 2001, DSR 2001:I, 5, para. 161.
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6. Practical issues relating to the draft disciplines on domestic regulation
6.1 Legal nature of the disciplines
Members have yet to decide on the most appropriate way to incorporate the dis-
ciplines in the GATS. If Members choose the option of an Annex, a slight, but still
consensus-based amendment of the GATS would probably be necessary. This
amendment would, inter alia, include an agreement on the future of Article VI:5 in
the post-Doha era. While Article VI:5(a), alias the transitional substantive pro-
vision of Article VI, could easily be deleted, a similar solution would not be suit-
able for Article VI:5(b) referring to international standards. The Draft, as it stands,
only covers technical standards and thus cannot be regarded as incorporating
Article VI:5(b). It seems reasonable that Members start considering the possibility
of including a new paragraph in the disciplines, most appropriately under the
section on ‘General Provisions’ which would incorporate Article VI:5(b). This
would allow a broader discussion amongMembers with respect to the appropriate
role of international standards when examining the necessity of a given measure.
Recall that the GATS, when compared to the TBT and SPS, adopts a much ‘softer ’
stance vis-à-vis international standards. The Annex, just like the other GATS
Annexes, would form an integral part of the GATS by virtue of Article XXIX
GATS. The option of a reference paper which would require Members to make
positive commitments under the additional commitments column of their
Schedules would not ensure a uniform application of the disciplines and should
rather not be considered as a meaningful option.
6.2 Justiciability and enforcement
Through Article VI and the completion of the mandate contemplated by paragraph
4, the GATS creates multilaterally established private rights against domestic
administrators and regulators and adds a multilateral layer of scrutiny regarding
the adherence of the competent authorities to the rule of law and due process in a
non-discriminatory manner.97 This is yet another example of the changing patterns
in international law and its effects on domestic rule-making and is revealing of a
trend towards increasing regulatory cooperation or even convergence.98 These
newly created private rights have to be protected and a multilateral scrutiny may
be too time-consuming or technically difficult to undertake. To avoid the draft
disciplines becoming dead letter, Members have to ensure that their regulators and
judicial or other review organs abide by the draft disciplines when they regulate or
when a service supplier has recourse to those organs, respectively.
As to judicial review in particular, it is argued that the requirement of
Article VI:2 GATS regarding the creation of prompt review mechanisms is not
97 Delimatsis, above n. 14, p. 34.
98 See, generally, Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart, above n. 35.
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sufficient. Rather, Members would be well-advised to agree on a provision (or set
of provisions) that allows for the possibility of negatively affected service suppliers
directly invoking before national courts their rights stemming from the disciplines.
Such a supplier-oriented approach99 would appear as going against the current
view that, generally, the WTO agreements are not recognized by national courts as
producing direct effect in domestic legal orders.100 In the EU, for instance, settled
case-law suggests that the nature and economy of these agreements prevents the
ECJ from examining the legality of EU acts based on the rules included in these
agreements and thus no rights are thereby conferred to private parties.101 However,
in this specific case, and due to the peculiar nature of future complaints, Members
should consider this option if the forthcoming disciplines are to have any
meaningful effects and really facilitate the everyday operation of service suppliers
worldwide. The problem appears more acute with respect to natural persons. To
better illustrate this, consider the case of individuals or natural persons negatively
affected by the disrespect of their rights by the host State who will most probably
be unable to convince their government to file a complaint before the WTO due to
the insignificant economic rents.
What also seems worthy of reflection is why matching the sophisticated level of
detail set out in Part III of the TRIPS Agreement does not make sense in the case
of the draft disciplines on domestic regulation under GATS. For instance,
the procedural rights contemplated by Articles 41:2 and 3 or 42 TRIPS are also
incorporated in the Draft, albeit not articulated in a similarly powerful manner.
TRIPS and enforcement of intellectual property rights seems to offer a useful
model in the quest for strong enforcement mechanisms in the case of the forth-
coming disciplines governing domestic regulations in services.
Taking again the example of the EU, it bears mention that the ECJ has been
more lenient when an issue relating to intellectual property rights and the TRIPS
Agreement is raised before the Court. For instance, in Hermès International, the
ECJ found that the national courts within the EU are obliged to apply national
rules relating to provisional measures for the protection of intellectual property
rights in the light of the text and the finality of the TRIPS and not only in the light
99 A similar point, although in a broader international law context, is made by Judge Simma, who
argues for effective judicial review to protect individuals. See B. Simma, ‘Universality of International Law
from the Perspective of a Practitioner’, European Journal of International Law, 20(2) (2009), 265, at 296;
also E.-U. Petersmann, ‘Multilevel Judicial Governance of International Trade Requires a Common
Conception of Rule of Law and Justice’, Journal of International Economic Law, 10(3) (2007), 529.
100 J. Jackson, ‘Direct Effect of Treaties in the US and the EU, the Case of theWTO: Some Perceptions
and Proposals’, in A. Arnull, P. Eeckhout, and T. Tridimas (eds.), Continuity and Change in EU Law
(Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 361.
101 See, inter alia, C-149/96, Portugal v Council [1999]. I-8395, paras. 47–49, and more recently,
C-351/04, Ikea Wholesale [2007] ECR I-7723, paras. 29–30. The ECJ accepted direct effect only in two
concrete cases, that is when, by adopting a given Community act, the Community aims to execute a
particular obligation taken under the WTO (C-69/89, Nakajima [1991] ECR I-2069, 27–31) or the
Community act explicitly refers to concrete provisions of any WTO agreement (70/87, Fediol [1989] ECR
1781, 19–22).
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of the EU legislation at issue.102 More interestingly, in Merck, the ECJ found that,
in cases where the EU has not exercised its competences – or, at least, to a sufficient
extent – in a given field (in the case at issue, the minimum duration of patent
protection), a national legal order and its courts can accept the direct effect of
a given TRIPS provision and thus give private parties the right to invoke that
provision directly.103 Again, the ECJ merely allows for a TRIPS-consistent
(if possible) application in cases where Community legislation already exists.104
Despite the last statement, however, it appears that under certain circumstances,
the ECJ would not outlaw the recognition of direct effect of a multilateral obli-
gation at the national level.
Another option which may enhance the possibilities of apposite enforcement of
the forthcoming disciplines is the establishment of a complaint mechanism within
the new Committee on Domestic Regulation, empowering private parties to notify
to that Committee the regulatory barriers they have encountered. Similarly,
the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) could also be used as a means of
exercising pressure to recalcitrating governments. While this appears to be useful,
as it would allow governments to pinpoint violations of the disciplines and to raise
this in their consultations with other governments, the main weakness of the
TPRM is the periodicity of reviews, which is contingent on the shares of world
trade of the countries being reviewed. Thus, the big developed economies are
reviewed every two years, while smaller economies are reviewed less frequently
(4–6 years). It follows that such ‘name and shame’ strategies may have limited
chances of success, notably when they are not accompanied by an effective mech-
anism that will examine the consistency of certain measures and practices with the
disciplines on domestic regulation.
A similar, albeit possibly more promising option is to establish a complaint
mechanism at the national level, e.g. within the one-stop-shop dealing with
applications, that will receive complaints made by service suppliers and which will
be notified and monitored by the Committee on Domestic Regulation. Under
this option, Members could consider allowing private parties to directly refer to
the multilateral disciplines and describe how the rights conferred to them were
violated at the domestic level.
102 C-53/96, Hermès International [1998] ECR I-3603, paras. 25–29; also C-260/08, HEKO
Industrieerzeugnisse GmbH, nyr, para 22.
103 C-431/05, Merck Genéricos Produtos Farmacêuticos [2007] ECR I-7001, paras. 34, 46, 48.
Established ECJ case-law suggests that a provision should be considered as being directly applicable
‘when, regard being had to the wording, purpose and nature of the agreement, it may be concluded that
the provision contains a clear, precise and unconditional obligation which is not subject, in its im-
plementation or effects, to the adoption of any subsequent measure’. See C-392/98, Dior and Others
[2000] ECR I-11307, para. 42.
104 Ibid, para. 47; also C-431/05, Merck Genéricos Produtos Farmacêuticos, para. 35. This is in line
with the broader principle of treaty-consistent interpretation within the EU. See M. Bronckers, ‘From
‘‘Direct Effect’’ to ‘‘Muted Dialogue’’ – Recent Developments in the European Courts’ Case Law on the
WTO and Beyond’, Journal of International Economic Law, 11(4) (2008), 888.
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These are only a few of the options that Members may consider to avoid ren-
dering the forthcoming disciplines unenforceable. It would be erroneous to take
the proper application and enforcement of the disciplines for granted. In a multi-
lateral trading system, which is traditionally based on State-to-State resolution of
disputes, low-level private-to-State disputes may not find their way to the WTO
adjudication system unless alternative routes are offered to these private parties to
enforce their rights or seek remedies for administrative decisions, which may ad-
versely affect their interests. It is contended here that Members should consider
these possible options before concluding their negotiations on domestic regulation
in the current Round to give full meaning to the disciplines and allow for their
proper enforcement at the national level.
7. Concluding remarks
Liberalization of trade in services is only useful when it goes hand in hand with
the promotion of sound domestic regulation. The Draft goes toward this direction,
but there is important scope for improvement, particularly with respect to the
substantive obligations of the disciplines. For it is erroneous to believe that sound
regulation only entails transparent and objective procedures. The substance of the
domestic regulation is crucial, as it can neutralize any market access concessions.
In view of the critical turn that the GATS negotiations on the creation of
rules governing domestic regulations have taken, this paper attempted to draw the
attention of negotiators to several essential issues which have to be carefully con-
sidered before the end of these negotiations on domestic regulation. It identified
several shortcomings of the draft disciplines in their current form and put forward
various proposals which may improve the efficacy of the disciplines and allow for
a more satisfactory and expedited enforcement at the national level of the pro-
cedural rights created at the multilateral level. The paper makes a strong case
for the inclusion in these disciplines of a necessity test applicable across services
sectors. It goes on to advance a concrete wording which may enjoy a critical mass
of support. GATT and WTO tradition has confirmed that necessity and trans-
parency are key proxies for drawing the fine line between legitimate regulatory
interference and disguised protectionism. At the risk of stating the obvious from
a good governance perspective, operational regulatory disciplines that embody a
necessity test and strong transparency disciplines are in the interest of all Members
and would facilitate the expansion of international trade in services when im-
plemented.
In addition, and from a dispute resolution perspective, notably when interpret-
ing non-discriminatory measures, the import of such protectionism-revelation
proxies is beyond doubt. The absence of a horizontally (i.e. across sectors) appli-
cable necessity test would render any regulatory disciplines on domestic regulation
of limited value, for no benchmark would be available to the WTO adjudicator
against which to judge the challenged measures. Worse, the use of other tests may
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still lead to their interpretation as a sort of a soft necessity test, the content of
which will be specified by the WTO adjudicating bodies. Therefore, to avoid un-
desirable judicial interpretations, Members should reconsider the value of ex ante
completing the contract by adopting a straightforward necessity test with com-
monly agreed caveats.105
The current negotiations constitute a unique opportunity to create a meaningful
and operational set of rules to improve domestic regulations governing service
supply worldwide. Negotiations at the horizontal level have advanced admirably
smoothly. However, allowing this set of rules to remain incomplete reduces the
likelihood of the situation being remedied in the future due to the considerable
transaction costs that negotiations of this type entail. This situation exemplifies
the need under certain circumstances to be sufficiently courageous and prospicient
to elaborate on certain aspects of the disciplines on domestic regulation before the
end of this Round.
In addition, the prospects for a deal in this area at the multilateral level have
never been better. This is evident from the myriad PTAs that accept the superiority
of the negotiations at the multilateral level and pledge to transpose the results
of these negotiations, once they are finalized, to their bilateral deals. Regardless
of whether they adopt a negative or positive list approach, all PTAs outsource,
explicitly or implicitly, the development of such disciplines at the multilateral
level. Thus, in this specific area, Members strive for coherence by favouring
multilateral negotiations that would lead to the creation of minimum standards or
rights of private parties in their capacity as service suppliers. In an era of growing
fragmentation of international trade regulation, domestic regulation is the
expression of Members’ willingness to achieve coherence when it comes to the
arguably most important category of measures affecting trade in services. Thus,
along with the mandate included in Article VI:4 GATS, there is another set of
mandates contemplated by these PTAs, which constitutes a sort of carte blanche in
favour of the negotiators at the multilateral level.
This is also revealing of the level of responsibility that the GATS negotiators
bear. Creating enforceable rules on domestic regulation and translating Article VI:4
into operational andmeaningful obligations has proven to be particularly challeng-
ing. More importantly, it has revealed the clear limits of peripheral experi-
mentation in key areas of rule-making (i.e. rules that are not directly related to
market access or liberalization outcomes), with increasing deference of the per-
iphery (i.e. PTAs covering services) towards the centre (i.e. the GATS) with regard
to solutions to the bulk of the unfinished rule-making agenda in services trade.
105 Being a highly incomplete contract with a high level of legal insecurity, the GATS generally
encourages a risk-averse approach from the side of Members, which may be also explaining – partly, at
least – the present negotiating deadlock. Cf. B. Hoekman, A. Mattoo, and A. Sapir, ‘The Political
Economy of Services Trade Liberalization: A Case For International Regulatory Cooperation?’, Oxford
Review of Economic Policy, 23(3) (2007), 367, at 385ff.
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